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by Catherine Giapponi and Carl Scheraga
Corporate transparency,	which	involves	financial,	governance,	and	competitive	strategy	disclosure,	
may	 have	 implications	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 development	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 alliance	 systems.	








Strategic alliances have become an increasingly important part of the corporate strategic planning 
process in the global airline industry. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of three global multi-
carrier alliances – Star, oneworld, and SkyTeam. These three alliances are comprised of airlines 
spanning numerous national cultures and geographic regions. This study examines the existing 
literature on competitive strategy disclosure. While governance and financial disclosure have 
been intensively investigated, the same is not true with regard to disclosure of firms’ competitive 
strategies. In this paper, this phenomenon is investigated within the context of the above mentioned 
global airline strategic alliances.  Drawing on existing literature, we provide a motivation for 
suggesting that there is an important need for competitive strategy transparency in such alliances. 
Additionally, previous empirical work suggests that national culture does indeed affect the level 
of transparency in firms’ competitive strategy. Thus, this study does two things. It measures the 
level of competitive strategy transparency within the three global airline alliances. Additionally, 
it empirically investigates whether, in the context of these alliances, national culture significantly 
affects the level of competitive strategy transparency. In fact, this study does find a statistically 
significant relationship in this regard. If, as noted below, global airline strategic alliances have yet 
to move beyond the initial phase of development, this empirical result highlights a managerial issue 
that will be of continuing importance with regard to the growth and success of these alliances.      
Michael Porter in his work The	Competitive	Advantage	of	Nations (1990, 66-67) ominously 
notes that “alliances are frequently transitional devices.” They may often be a temporary managerial 
reaction in industries undergoing structural change or escalating competition. Doganis (2001) has 
argued that there are three phases to building strategic alliances in the global airline industry, such 
that, these partnerships achieve a sense of long-term commitment on the part of alliance participants. 
The first of these phases is primarily oriented toward generating additional revenues through the 
mechanisms of network expansion and joint marketing. The second phase is focused on cost savings. 
This may entail separate agreements between strategic alliance partners in specific areas where joint 
operations can reduce costs. The final or third phase is characterized by the partners commingling 
their assets and using them jointly. There will be the movement away from separate brand identities 
to the emphasis and adoption of a single alliance brand.  
A Boston Consulting Group study by Cools and Roos (2005) suggests that global airline 
strategic alliances have not moved beyond the first of the phases described by Doganis (2001). 
The study notes that alliances in this industry developed as a strategic alternative to merger and 
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acquisition strategies that were prohibited by regulatory and cultural barriers. Excess capacity and 
poor economic performance moved the airline industry to pursue strategic alliances that would 
provide opportunities similar to those associated with consolidation, including: operational 
synergies, the reduction of costs, improved asset utilization, and platforms for future growth. Airline 
alliances have provided consumers with benefits that include improved connectivity and increased 
flight frequency, as well as the consolidation of frequent flyer programs. Cools and Roos (2005, 18) 
go on to emphasize, however, that the extra revenue that has resulted from these consumer benefits 
has been almost fully realized or “harvested.” It is noted that the alliances have not been as effective 
in achieving difficult cost synergies. The study identifies four barriers that inhibit the facilitation of 
more extensive synergies. One impediment is an asymmetry of benefits that accrue to the airlines 
that make the initial investments necessary to generate the cost synergies. Perceived inequity in 
financial return on such investments will reduce an alliance partner’s willingness to invest in such 
programs. In addition, not all alliance members will have the necessary competencies to realize the 
full benefits. The irreversibility of investments necessary for a commitment to an alliance is another 
barrier noted in the study. A third barrier is the perception that a significant engagement in a strategic 
alliance erodes future potential options, both financial and managerial, as it reduces the partner’s 
ability to pursue alternative opportunities. Finally, cumbersome decision-making and alliance 
governance issues complicate the development of more extensive operational relationships. To this 
latter point, often every airline in an alliance has an equal vote, regardless of size or importance. 
Thus, operational consolidations have typically been bilateral in nature, involving only two members 
of an alliance, rather than all members.
Doganis (2001) suggests that for global airline strategic alliances to move from phase one to 
phase three, there must be a sharing of long-term vision and objectives by all the alliance partners. 
The vision and objectives of an alliance must be communicated to and understood by each level 
of personnel in the participant airlines.  Additionally, clear, neutral but strong strategic alliance 
governance must be in place.  
Given the importance of a shared understanding of vision and objectives, strategic transparency, 
as influenced by national culture, is an important factor to consider in the identification of barriers 
that inhibit the evolution of airline alliance systems beyond phase one. This study examines the 
issue of strategic	 transparency	and	disclosure	 in the context of the three major global strategic 
alliances in the airline industry. As noted above, while these alliances have been successful in 
achieving incremental revenue enhancements, they have been less so with regard to the achievement 
of economic synergies. Santema and van Oijen (2005, 354) define strategy disclosure as “…the 
revelation of information an organization decides to share with its stakeholders on the strategy 
it is pursuing and going to pursue in the future.”  The current study explores the extent of such 
“revelation” or the intensity of competitive strategy disclosure by the members of the three major 
global airline alliances. The framework used in this research for measuring the transparency in a 
firm’s competitive strategy is an adaptation of a model developed by Santema and van Oijen (2005). 
This framework rests on a foundation that allows for an understanding of the organizational drivers 
of these economic synergies, specifically those associated with competitive strategy transparency. 
Competitive strategy transparency is investigated by the examination of corporate annual reports. 
The 2005 annual reports of all the members of the three major airline alliances – Star, oneworld, and 
SkyTeam – are utilized. There is, as detailed below, analytical precedent for this approach.  
As noted above, the three alliances are comprised of airlines that span numerous national 
cultures. The seminal work by Gray (1988) and subsequent research has demonstrated a relationship 
between a country’s cultural profile as measured by Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions and the level of 
disclosure in the annual corporate reports of firms in that country. Thus, this study investigates not 
only the level of competitive strategy transparency demonstrated by participants in each of the three 
major airline alliances but the relationship between said transparency and the cultural identity of 
each of the participants. 
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COMPETITIVE STRATEGY DISCLOSURE 
The focus of the theoretical and academic literature on transparency has been on the concept of 
corporate	transparency. The manner is which this concept has been defined in empirical studies is 
typified by the framework of Bushman et al. (2004). This framework has five components: financial 
disclosures, governance disclosures, accounting principles, timeliness of disclosures, and credibility 
of disclosures. Financial disclosure includes information on business segment performance, R&D 
and capital expenditures, accounting policies, and subsidiary operations. Governance disclosure 
encompasses information on major shareholders, management, boards of directors, director and 
officer remuneration, and director and officer shareholdings. Accounting principles relate to 
information on consolidation and discretionary reserves or balance sheet accounts representing 
temporary accumulations of earnings from the current year or recent past, while timeliness of 
disclosures captures the frequency of reporting, the consolidation of interim reports, and the number 
of disclosed items. The credibility of disclosures is the percentage of information audited by the Big 
5 accounting firms in a country (Bushman et al. 2004).
Not surprisingly, this framework for defining corporate transparency is reflected in the 
corporate governance indices that have been developed to measure transparency (see Doidge et al. 
forthcoming). The Standard & Poor’s (S&P) governance transparency index includes variables drawn 
from the three broad categories of ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency 
and information disclosure, and board and management structure and processes (Standard & Poors 
2004). The governance ratings of Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) construct a composite 
index from variables reflecting the seven categories of management discipline, transparency, 
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility (Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia 2001). Transparency is measured in a manner that is almost identical to the model 
of Bushman et al. (2004) noted above. Finally, governance ratings constructed by the FTSE Group 
and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) utilize criteria in the eight categories of board, audit, 
charter/bylaws, anti-takeover provisions, executive and director compensation, qualitative factors, 
ownership, and director education (Institutional Shareholder Services 2003). The CLSA ratings 
cover emerging and newly-emerged countries. The S&P and ISS ratings cover both developed and 
emerging countries.
Giapponi and Scheraga (2007) examined the issue of governance disclosure on the part of global 
airlines in each of the three major alliances. They utilized an extended variable set that built upon 
the original five variables utilized by Bushman et al. (2004) in their definition of the transparency 
sub-category of governance disclosure. Because airline strategic alliances span an array of national 
cultures which influence the development of such relationships, they also examined the impact of 
national culture as a determinant of governance transparency. A significant finding of this study is 
that national culture impacts corporate governance disclosure in the airline industry thus highlighting 
the importance of understanding the role cultural factors play in corporate transparency as it impacts 
the evolving relationships in the airline alliance networks.
Although governance and financial disclosure have been studied extensively, there appears to 
be a dearth of empirical work that examines those aspects of corporate transparency that focus 
specifically on the competitive strategy of the firm. A study by Meek et al. (1995) examined some 
aspects of strategy disclosure as part of a larger research study of voluntary disclosure and was 
limited to companies in U.S., U.K., and Continental Europe. More focused strategy disclosure 
research was conducted by Santema and van de Rijt (2001), but the study involved only Dutch 
companies. Santema and van Oijen (2005) extended the research of strategic transparency in their 
examination of firms across multiple industries in five European countries. Unlike these studies, 
which are limited in global reach, our research in the global airline industry affords the opportunity 
to examine competitive strategic disclosure across a much larger number of countries and cultures.
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GLOBAL AIRLINE STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY 
IN STRATEGY 
Porter (1980) provides a comprehensive discussion of the elements of a competitive strategy. A 
firm’s competitive strategy is articulated through two key elements. The first is the firm’s goals 
which provide a broad definition of how it defines its basis for competing and its specific economic 
and non-economic objectives. The second is the operating policies through which the firm seeks 
to achieve these goals.  In formulating its competitive strategy, a firm must consider its internal 
strengths and weaknesses, broad macro environmental and industry specific opportunities and 
threats, the personal values of the organization, and broader societal expectations.
The above discussion suggests a strong need for transparency in competitive strategies between 
strategic alliance partners. It was noted above that Porter (1980) defined two key elements that 
comprised a firm’s competitive strategy. The first was a clear articulation of a firm’s goals and 
objectives. Specific to strategic alliances, Whipple and Frankel (2000) suggest that clear goals 
and the ability to meet performance expectations are important factors influencing the success of 
alliances relationships. Other important factors include trust, senior management support, and partner 
compatibility (Whipple and Frankel 2000). It has been argued that different alliance partners may 
have different views on trust and what it entails (Koza and Levin 1998; Whipple and Frankel 2000). 
If mutual trust is best fostered when the structure of an alliance closely supports the intent of the 
alliance, then alliances must be carefully planned and controlled so that trust and defined boundaries 
are not violated (Spekman et al. 1998; Whippel and Frankel 2000). Critical to the formation of an 
alliance is agreement on the expected contribution of each participant and the allocation of profits. 
Such agreement is not always easily reached because every firm has its own unique objectives that 
it wishes to achieve (Lewis 1990). It is important, therefore, that each alliance member has a clear 
understanding of what it must invest in the strategic alliance and what the alliance member can 
expect in return. Such understanding implies a need for strategic transparency.   
The studies just noted generally focus on partner and relationship characteristics in strategic 
alliances. A study by Saxton (1997) observes that similarity in organizational processes is desirable 
for the promotion of cooperation in strategic alliances. Thus, the potential for a positive outcome 
in a strategic alliance is enhanced by the reputation of alliance partners, the existence of a prior 
relationship between partners, shared decision-making, and similarities between partners.
However, the need for transparency in strategic alliance partners’ competitive strategies also 
arises from a somewhat more subtle set of empirically observed phenomena. The second key 
element, as defined by Porter (1980), of a firm’s competitive strategy is the set of operating policies 
through which goals are achieved. More specifically, Porter (1996) suggests that strategy is the 
creation of a unique and valuable position involving a different set of activities from those pursued 
by competitors. Furthermore, strategy requires that the firm create a fit between its various activities. 
Fit is the unique way a firm’s activities interact and reinforce one another. Thus, in contrast to the 
above literature, there is a complementary body of research that suggests that it is the differences in 
the competitive strategies of strategic alliance partners that produce synergistic effects. Schneider 
et al. (1997) suggest that differences with regard to competitive strategies enhance the ability of 
cooperative agreements to adapt to changes in the environment.  Schneider and Bowen (1995) 
observe that differing perspectives on how to reach organizational goals may act to prevent the 
development of strategic myopia and inflexibility.  Indeed, in a study of 78 international cooperation 
cases, van Oudenhoven and van der Zee (2002) found that with regard to corporate competitive 
strategy, strategic dissimilarity rather than similarity was critical to cooperation success. 
Thus, sets of both strategic similarities and differences give rise to the important need for 
transparency in firms’ competitive strategies. Similarity with regard to certain processes is necessary 
to build cooperation and trust-based relationships within strategic alliances. At the same time, 
distinctive/different competencies and resources are necessary in order for strategic alliances to 
build unique competitive advantages.  
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STRATEGIC TRANSPARENCY AND NATIONAL CULTURE 
As noted above, strategic transparency may have implications for alliance development and success. 
However, in a global alliance system, national cultural differences could impact perceptions of 
transparency and the willingness to disclose information. In examining cross-cultural differences, 
Hofstede (1980, 1984) and Hofstede and Bond (1988) identified five dimensions of national culture: 
individualism versus collectivism, power distance, masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty 
avoidance, and short-term versus long-term orientation. The dimension of individualism versus 
collectivism indicates the extent to which a society is a “loosely knit social framework” in which 
people are “supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only,” instead of a 
“tightly knit social framework” in which people distinguish between in-groups and out-groups and 
expect their in-group to look after them in exchange for loyalty (Hofstede 1984, 83). The dimension 
of power distance indicates the extent to which a society accepts the fact that “power in institutions 
and organizations is distributed unequally” among individuals (Hofstede 1984, 83). The dimension 
of masculinity versus femininity indicates the extent to which the dominant values in society tend 
toward assertiveness and the acquisition of things, and away from concern for people and the 
quality of life. The dimension of uncertainty avoidance indicates the extent to which a society feels 
threatened by ambiguous situations and tries to avoid them by providing rules, believing in absolute 
truths, and refusing to tolerate deviation from the rule. Finally, the dimension of a short-term versus 
long- term orientation indicates the extent to which a society exhibits a pragmatic future-oriented 
perspective rather than a conventional historic or short-term point of view (Adler 1997).
In his study of the relationship between cultural/societal values and the development of 
accounting systems, attitudes toward financial management and disclosure, and the regulation 
of the accounting profession, Gray (1988) developed a framework of analysis using Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions. He identified four accounting value dimensions that influence a nation’s 
financial reporting practices: professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity versus flexibility, 
conservatism versus optimism, and secrecy versus transparency. The fourth dimension, secrecy vs. 
transparency, is of particular interest to this study which explores competitive strategy disclosure. As 
defined by Gray (1988, 8), secrecy is a “preference for confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure 
of information about the business only to those who are closely involved with its management and 
financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and publicly accountable approach.” He goes 
on to hypothesize that countries ranking higher in uncertainty avoidance and power distance will 
rank higher in terms of secrecy. Gray (1988) indicates that high uncertainty avoidance implies a 
preference for secrecy because of the need to restrict information disclosures in order to avoid 
conflict and competition.  He also argues that societies ranking high on power distance prefer 
secrecy, or a lower level of disclosure, in order to preserve inequalities in power.  Further, the lower 
a country ranks in terms of individualism “the more likely it is to rank high in terms of secrecy” 
(Gray 1988, 11). A collectivistic orientation, societies ranking lower in individualism, with a sense 
of responsibility to insiders as opposed to those external to the firm, would also be consistent with 
greater secrecy. With regard to masculinity, “more caring societies where more emphasis is given 
to the quality of life, people, and the environment, will tend to be more open” and transparent with 
regard to information (Gray 1988, 11). Therefore, societies with a masculine orientation would be 
more secretive than feminine cultures.       
Competitive strategy disclosure is the most voluntary of the corporate disclosure categories. 
Therefore, the authors contend that cultural orientation, measured along Hofstede’s dimensions, 
influences the level and intensity of strategy disclosure. National cultural differences have important 
implications for strategy disclosure in the global airline industry and are important in the context of 
alliance development.
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THE USE OF CORPORATE ANNUAL REPORTS TO MEASURE TRANSPARENCY
 
This research study uses corporate annual reports to assess the extent to which the members of the 
three major airline alliances disclose information relative to their strategy. Annual reports have been 
used extensively in research involving information disclosure (see Stanton and Stanton (2002) for an 
overview of the research perspectives used in corporate annual report studies). They are a medium 
through which companies communicate with their stakeholders and the public. However, corporate 
annual reports are more than formal documents used to convey mandatory corporate reporting 
requirements. As suggested by Hopwood (1996, 55), corporate annual reports construct a “particular 
visibility and meaning” as opposed to “what was there.” Similarly, Hines (1988, 257) addresses the 
notion of communicating and constructing reality in annual report financial accounting disclosure: 
“We create a picture of an organization, or the ‘economy,’ whatever you like, and on the basis of that 
picture (not some underlying ‘real’ reality of which no one is aware), people think and act. And by 
responding to that picture of reality, they make it so; it becomes ‘real in its consequences.’ And what 
is more, when people respond to that picture, and the consequences occur, they see it as proof of our 
having correctly conveyed reality.”  
The use of annual reports for studies related specifically to disclosure has been well documented. 
Botosan (1997, 329) states that “although the annual report is only one means of corporate reporting, 
it should serve as a good proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure provided by a firm across 
all disclosure avenues.” Lang and Lundholm (1993) note that annual report disclosure levels are 
positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other media.  Knutson (1992, 7) 
states that “at the top of every analyst’s list (of financial reports used by analysts) is the annual 
report to shareholders. It is the major reporting document and every other financial report is in some 
respect subsidiary or supplementary to it.” Patel and Dallas (2002, 6) suggest that the use of annual 
reports “facilitates analysis and comparison of companies around the globe.”   
DATA COLLECTION
An analysis of the intensity of strategy disclosure was conducted through the examination of the 
2005 corporate annual reports filed by the full members of the three major airline alliances, Star, 
oneworld, and SkyTeam at that point in time. Two independent readers were utilized and their content 
analysis compared to reconcile any discrepancies. The initial content analysis yielded over 90% 
agreement between the readers. Any inconsistencies, as noted, were reconciled through discussion 
and further review of the annual reports. The Star Alliance members examined in the study included 
Air Canada, Air New Zealand, ANA, Austrian, LOT Polish Airlines, Lufthansa, SAS, Singapore 
Airlines, South African Airlines, Swiss, TAP Portugal, Thai, United, U.S. Airways, and Varig. It 
should be noted that annual reports for two members of the Star Alliance, Asiana and BMI, were 
not available for 2005 or the prior year 2004.  These companies were, therefore, excluded from the 
research. The members of the oneworld Alliance included in the study consisted of Aer Lingus, 
American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Iberia, LAN, and Qantas. The SkyTeam 
Alliance members studied included Aeroflot, Aero Mexico, Air France, Alitalia, Continental, Czech 
Airlines, Delta, Korean Air, and Northwest Airlines. It should be noted that the 2005 annual reports 
were not available for Varig and Swiss Air International. However, the authors had access to the 
2004 annual reports and thus these were used in the analysis. The 32 airlines included in this study 
are listed in Table 1, along with an indication of their respective alliance membership.
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South African Airways Star
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A template was developed to measure the degree of disclosure of competitive strategy by 
airlines in each of the three global strategic alliances. This template, an adaptation of the Santema 
and van Oijen (2005) model, included the following items:
 
Business Definition:  1. 
Describe the business of the corporation/airline. a. 
Scope of the business:  geographic (number and identification of destinations/locations), b. 
customer markets, long haul/short haul, etc.
Address the question:  Who do we serve and how do we serve them? c. 
Goals (Qualitative) and Vision:2.  For example “become a leading airline”; “become number 
one in every market in which we fly”; “become the number one European carrier.”
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Objectives:3.   Describe what is to be accomplished and when - specification of quantifiable 
objectives with target date for achievement.
Internal Strengths:4.  Identification of strategically critical organizational assets (tangible or 
intangible), core and distinctive competencies, core capabilities.
Internal Weaknesses: 5. Identification of resource gaps, core deficiencies.
Opportunities:6.   Identification of external factors/forces/trends (competitive, economic, 
political/legal, social/cultural, technological) that pose opportunities.
Threats:7.   Identification of external factors/forces/trends (competitive, economic, political/
legal, social/cultural, technological) that pose threats. 
Strategic matching of internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and 8. 
threats.  Indicated how organizational strengths could be used to take advantage of external 
opportunities and/or used to reduce the airline’s vulnerability to external threats.  Indicated how 
organizational weaknesses inhibit the airline’s ability to take advantage of opportunities and/or 
increased its vulnerability to external threats and how such weaknesses could be overcome.  
Corporate Level Strategy:9.   Identification of the industries/businesses in which the company 
is/should be involved; Discussion of the directional strategy with respect to growth (growth, 
stability, retrenchment); Discussion of strategies to manage across units (synergies).
Business Level Strategies:10.  How is/should the company compete?  (Porter (1980):  Low cost 
position, differentiation, niche/focus). 
Monitoring/Control/Benchmarking:11.  Indication of efforts to monitor and benchmark 
performance areas – identification of specific initiatives to collect data and measure 
performance.
Examples of Realized Goals/Strategies:12.  Concrete examples of the achievement of previous 
year’s goals and objectives and the tactical strategies that contributed to goal achievement.
13.  Examples of Projected Goals/Strategies:  Concrete examples of strategies to achieve next 
year’s goals and objectives – specific tactical strategies. 
  All of the narrative sections of the annual reports of each airline were read and assessed to 
determine the relative level of disclosure for each of the 13 strategy items. The transparency of each 
item was evaluated on a scale of no disclosure, minimum level of disclosure for the sample, average 
level of disclosure for the sample, and above average level of disclosure for the sample. Numerical 
scores of zero, one, two, and three were assigned accordingly. A total score was calculated across all 
13 categories for each airline.  
Table 2 displays Hofstede’s (1980) indices, scores attributable to each airline based on national 
culture, for each of four dimensions: uncertainty avoidance (UA), power distance (PD), individualism 
(IND), and masculinity (MAS). High values for each of these four indices would indicate a national 
culture characterized by high uncertainty avoidance, high power distance, strong individualistic 
qualities, and a strong masculine orientation. It should be noted that scores for the fifth dimension 
of short-term versus long-term orientation were not available, as the original study by Hofstede 
and Bond (1988) that examined this dimension provided scores for only a very small subset of the 
airlines in this study. 
The total strategy disclosure score for each airline is also displayed in Table 2. As previously 
noted, 13 strategy categories were evaluated and rated with scores ranging from 0 to 3 based on the 
degree of transparency. Therefore, the lowest possible strategy disclosure score for an airline is 0 
and the highest score is 39. Scores above a 30 indicate significant competitive strategy disclosure 
and transparency. 
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Table 2: Disclosure and Cross-Cultural Factor Ratings* 
 Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity




Aer Lingus 35 28 70 68 16
American Airlines 46 40 91 62 24
British Airways 35 35 89 66 34
Cathay Pacific Airways 29 68 25 57 17
Finnair 59 33 63 26 28
Iberia Airlines 86 57 51 42 27
LAN 86 63 23 28 23
Qantas Airways 51 36 90 61 30
SKYTEAM
Aeroflot 95 93 39 36 21
Aeromexico 82 81 30 69 23
Air France 86 68 71 43 31
Alitalia 75 50 76 70 27
Continental Airlines 46 40 91 62 26
Czech Airlines 74 57 58 57 30
Delta Airlines 46 40 91 62 30
Korean Airlines 85 60 18 39 22
Northwest Airlines 46 40 91 62 30
STAR
Air Canada 48 39 80 52 26
Air New Zealand 49 22 79 58 36
All Nippon Airways 92 54 46 95 28
Austrian Airlines 70 11 55 79 37
LOT Airlines 93 68 60 64 23
Lufthansa 65 35 67 66 34
Scandinavian Airlines 34 27 71 9 32
Singapore Airlines 8 74 20 48 18
South African Airways 49 49 65 63 25
Swiss International Airlines 58 34 68 70 27
TAP Air Portugal 104 63 27 31 24
Thai Airways 64 64 20 34 22
United Airlines 46 40 91 62 25
US Airways 46 40 91 62 29
Varig 76 69 38 49 11
* Hofstede (1980)  
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
As seen in Table 2, there are differences between the airlines relative to the level of competitive 
strategy disclosure. The disclosure scores ranged from a low of 11 (Varig) to a high of 37 (Austrian 
Airlines). The median score for all of the airlines was 26.5. In terms of differences in the intensity of 
competitive strategy disclosure between the alliances, alliance membership does not appear to have 
an impact on the level of disclosure. The differences of the mean disclosure scores among alliances 
were not statistically significant.
Within each alliance, individual airline disclosure scores differed and the importance of 
national culture is apparent. The relationship between Hofstede’s cross-cultural factors (1980) and 
competitive strategy disclosure was examined by dividing the sample into those airlines that were 
above the median in competitive strategy disclosure (as measured by the total score) and those that 
were below the median. A test of differences in means was done using the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
test (see Table 3A). The software utilized is the NPAR1WAY procedure in SAS (2002).  This test 
was performed with and without the U.S. airlines. Annual reports of U.S. airlines include the Form 
10K in addition to other material. Thus, these airlines were held out of the sample when the test was 
performed a second time to test for any bias because of this difference in annual report format (See 
Table 3B).  
Table 3A: Non-parametric Test of Means (Wilcoxon) of Cross-Cultural Factors
    Above Median versus Below Median Disclosure – Full Sample
UA PD IND MAS
Above Median 60.75 39.94*** 72.31** 58.00
Below Median 62.00 58.69*** 49.25** 51.50
*** = Statistically significant at 1% level
  ** = Statistically significant at 5% level
Table 3B: Non-parametric Test of Means (Wilcoxon) of Cross-Cultural Factors
    Above Median versus Below Median Disclosure – U.S. Airlines Excluded
UA PD IND MAS
Above Median 64.15 39.92*** 68.00*** 57.08
Below Median 65.69 63.00*** 39.62*** 49.08
*** = Statistically significant at 1% level
The findings indicate that there is a correlation between national culture and strategy information 
disclosure. The results displayed in Table 3A show that the intensity of competitive strategy disclosure 
is negatively correlated with power distance, with statistical significance at a 1% level. Therefore, 
airlines from societies that are more accepting of power inequalities disclosed less information 
relative to organizational strategy. This supports Gray’s (1988) hypothesis that countries ranking 
higher in power distance will rank higher in secrecy. Reporting in low power distance cultures 
tends to be more comprehensive than in high power distance cultures (Hussein 1996). In this study, 
Austrian Airlines, for example, had the lowest power distance rating in the sample and scored the 
highest on level of strategy disclosure.  
There is a positive correlation between the intensity of disclosure and individualism at a 5% level 
of statistical significance. Airlines from countries that ranked higher in individualism ranked higher 
in competitive strategy disclosure. The demand for accountability may be greater in individualist 
societies and, therefore, the level of disclosure may be greater than that of collectivist societies 
(Santema and van Oijen 2005). This finding also supports Gray’s hypothesis that countries ranking 
lower in terms of individualism rank higher in terms of secrecy and, therefore, lower in disclosure. 
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Societies favoring a collectivist orientation, by distinguishing between in-groups and out-groups, 
reveal less information to external constituencies and the public. The relationship between strategy 
disclosure and masculinity was not found to be statistically significant. Similarly, the relationship 
between strategy disclosure and uncertainty avoidance was not statistically significant. In this case, 
however, the findings indicate that the direction of the relationship supports Gray’s (1988) hypothesis 
that countries ranking higher in uncertainty avoidance will rank higher in secrecy.
The results presented in Table 3B, which excludes the U.S. airlines whose annual reports 
include the Form 10K, support the findings discussed above. The level of competitive strategy 
disclosure is negatively correlated with power distance, with statistical significance at a 1% level. 
The positive correlation between the intensity of disclosure and individualism actually improved to 
a 1% level when the U.S. airlines were excluded. As in Table 3A, the relationships between strategy 
disclosure and masculinity and strategy disclosure and uncertainty avoidance were not found to 
be statistically significant. Again, the direction of the relationship between strategy disclosure and 
uncertainty avoidance supports Gray’s (1988) hypothesis. It should be noted that the differences in 
cross-cultural factor ratings between the three airline alliances were not statistically significant.
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the disclosure score variable and each 
of Hofstede’s four cultural dimension variables. The statistically significant correlations between the 
disclosure score variables and those for power distance and individualism are consistent with the 
results in Table 3A and Table 3B. However, there is also information in Table 4 which yields an even 
richer story as to how the four dimension variables interact and reinforce each other. In addition 
to ranking national cultures along the four dimensions of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, 
individualism, and masculinity, Hofstede (1991) also considered pairings of these dimensions to 
further describe particular countries, based on the pair-wise inter-correlations between the four 
dimension variables. He found that nations like Thailand, Korea, Singapore, Chile, Portugal, 
Japan, Brazil, Hong Kong, and Mexico were characterized as large power distance - collectivist. 
These are the home countries of Thai Airways, Korean Airlines, Singapore Airlines, LAN, Tap Air 
Portugal, All Nippon Airways, Varig, Cathay Pacific Airways, and Aeromexico, which is reflected 
in the statistically significant negative correlation (-0.67 in Table 4) between power distance and 
individualism in this study’s sample. 
Nations like South Africa, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, France, Italy, Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain, and the United States were characterized as individualist - 
masculine. These are the home countries of South African Airways, Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa, 
Swiss International Airlines, Aer Lingus, Air France, Alitalia, Air Canada, Air New Zealand, Qantas 
Airways, British Airways, American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest 
Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways, which is reflected in the statistically significant positive 
correlation (0.35 in Table 4) between individualism and masculinity in this study’s sample.
Nations like Korea, Thailand, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, Spain, and Japan were 
characterized as strong uncertainty avoidance - collectivist. These are the home countries of Korean 
Airlines, Thai Airways, LAN, Aeromexico, Tap Air Portugal, Varig, Iberia Airlines, and All Nippon 
Airways, which is reflected in the statistically significant negative correlation  (-0.39 in Table 4) 
between uncertainty avoidance and individualism in this study’s sample.
Finally, nations like Thailand, Italy, Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Spain, France, Japan, and 
Portugal were characterized as large power distance - strong uncertainty avoidance. These are the 
home countries of Thai Airways, Alitalia, Varig, Korean Airlines, Aeromexico, Iberia Airlines, Air 
France, All Nippon Airways, and TAP Air Portugal, which is reflected in the statistically significant 
positive correlation (0.45 in Table 4) between power distance and uncertainty avoidance in this 
study’s sample.
The correlation between masculinity and uncertainty avoidance and masculinity and power 
distance were not found to be statistically significant in this sample. 
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Hofstede’s Dimensions and Disclosure Score
 Prob > |r| under H0: Rho = 0
DSCORE UA PD IND MAS
















*** = Statistically significant at 1% level
  ** = Statistically significant at 5% level
The relationship between these dimensional pairings or subgroups and the level of competitive 
strategy disclosure was examined using the Tukey-Kramer method (Tukey 1953, Kramer 1956). In 
this case, testing differences in the means was complicated by the fact that the sub-samples were of 
unequal size. The original Tukey test (1952) was designed specifically for pair wise comparisons 
based on the studentized range ratio (see formula below) and controls the maximum experiment-
wise error rate (MEER) when the sample sizes are equal. The sample sizes in this study were not 
equal and, therefore, the unequal cell sizes required that an extension of the test proposed by Tukey 
(1952, 1953) be used. Tukey (1953) and Kramer (1956) independently proposed a modification for 
unequal cell sizes and it is the Tukey-Kramer method that was used in this study. Hayter (1984) 
provided proof that the Tukey-Kramer procedure controls the MEER and it has also fared well in 
Monte Carlo studies (Dunnett 1980).  








 observations in each group respectively and s 
being the root mean square error based on ν degrees of freedom, their means      and      are considered 
significantly different by the Tukey-Kramer criterion if:
(1)
where q(;κ,ν) is the α-level critical value of a studentized range distribution of κ independent 
normal random variables with ν degrees of freedom. The software utilized is the GLM (General 
Linear Model) procedure in SAS (2002), which calculates significance for the Tukey-Kramer 
statistic at the 5% level.       
As can be seen in Table 5, airlines whose national culture was classified as either large power 
distance - collectivist or uncertainty avoidance - collectivist had disclosure scores which, on average, 
were statistically significantly less than those of the other airlines in the sample. Airlines whose 
national culture was classified as individualist - masculine had disclosure scores, which on average, 
were statistically significantly greater than those of the other airlines in the sample. No statistically 
significant difference was found for airlines whose national culture was classified as power distance 
- strong uncertainty avoidance and the other airlines in the sample.
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Table 5: Non-Parametric Test of Means (Tukey-Kramer)
 Disclosure Differences by Large Power Distance - Collectivist, Individualist - 
 Masculine, Uncertainty Avoidance - Collectivist, Power Distance - Strong 
 Uncertainty Avoidance Subgroups
Disclosure Score
Large Power Distance - Collectivist (n = 9) 20.89**
Others (n = 23) 28.17**
Disclosure Score
Individualist – Masculine (n = 17) 28.65**
Others (n = 15) 23.27**
Disclosure Score
Uncertainty Avoidance – Collectivist (n = 8) 22.50**
Others (n = 24) 27.33**
Disclosure Score
Power Distance - Strong Uncertainty Avoidance (n = 9) 23.89
Others (n = 23) 27.00
** = Statistically significant at 5% level
CONCLUSION
The results of the study indicate that there is a discernable and significant relationship between 
national culture and the intensity of corporate strategy disclosure in the airline industry. As compared 
to financial and governance information, competitive strategy disclosure is the most voluntary 
with little in the way of common disclosure standards. National values and cultural differences, 
therefore, may have a more profound impact on the disclosure of strategy information. The practical 
implications for managers in the airline industry include the recognition that members of the same 
alliance may not view the need to disclose information from the same cultural lenses and, therefore, 
voluntary disclosure will vary across companies. Further, the results of the study suggest that 
membership in an alliance does not guarantee commonality in the level of information sharing, 
specifically strategic information.    
As noted earlier, it has been observed that the global airline strategic alliances have not 
moved beyond the initial phase, as described by Doganis (2001), that is oriented toward revenue 
generation through network expansion and joint marketing (Cools and Roos 2005). National 
cultural differences as they relate to information disclosure may play a role in inhibiting the progress 
toward the subsequent phases. The potential benefits and synergies that can be achieved through 
the alliance systems may be more readily apparent and realized with increased competitive strategy 
transparency.  
Future studies that examine the relationship between corporate transparency and alliance 
membership stability, relationship development, and economic benefits/success may provide 
greater insight into alliance development barriers. Longitudinal studies focusing on the intensity of 
information disclosure and the success of alliance systems over time may provide airline managers 
with practical insight into the implications of information asymmetry on the long-term effectiveness 
of alliance relationships. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Varig, whose disclosure score of 
11 was the lowest in the sample, has subsequently left the Star Alliance.  In addition, future studies 
that integrate multiple dimensions of information disclosure including financial, governance, and 
strategic information, may provide a more complete understanding of differences in corporate 
transparency within and among the airline alliances.   
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